From the mechanics of the model to the dialectic of strategies
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[edit] Analyses
In this section Bourdieu introduces his theories of objectivism and identifies challenges with anthropology. Specifically that “the anthropologist has a particular relation to the object of his study contains the makings of a theoretical distortion inasmuch as his situation as an observer” (p. 1) from which he understands the practices or representations of practices from a distance. The anthropologist does not have an understanding of why or the practicality of the practices they observe so they create frameworks of rules and roles of their objects. In addressing this issue of mis-representation or incomplete representation Bourdieu suggests a two stage process or practice of breaking with native experience and native representation of that experience, and a second break of questioning his practice as an outside observer of interpreting practices. “in taking up a point of view on the action, withdrawing from it in order to observe it from above and from a distance, he constitutes practical activity as an object of observation and analysis, a representation” (p.2).
[edit] From the mechanics of the model to the dialectic of strategies
Bourdieu continues his discussion of a second break by identifying three modes of theoretical knowledge related to anthropological theses that he says are all opposed to practical knowledge. Phenomenological—sets out to make explicit the truth of primary experience of the social world; Objectivist—constructs the objective relations which structure practice and representation of practice; and Explicit—structures of the social world and objective truth of primary experience. It is only through the second break, questioning of objectivism and grasping limits of objectivist knowledge, which is inevitable in scientific knowledge that a theory of theory and a theory of practice are integrated into practices of science. “objectivist knowledge poses the question of the conditions of the possibility of primary experience and theory of practice…question[s] the conditions which make such knowledge possible” (p.4).
Bourdieu uses Mauss’s phenomenological approach to the gift exchange to illustrate this perspective arguing that the exchange is not about the individual operation of giving a gift and then obligation of gifting, giving, in return. Instead, it is the manipulation of timing of the exchange and response triggered by the exchange that gives the exchange its’ meaning. The full truth of the exchange is comprised of two opposing truths, the gift as intended to be experience and the gift as seen form the outside. The counter-gift must be deferred and different Timing is strategy, reflects one’s capital, the state of structural relations (obligation and advantage); and reflects the uncertainty and ambiguity of practice and the social world.
[edit] From the “rules” of honour to sense of honour
Bourdieu continues discussion of rules and models in relation to the symbolism of social interaction and practical knowledge. He describes it as a continuous interaction of action, reaction and expectation among participants like checks and balances which he calls “checks and corrections” of their interaction. This is illustrated through discussion of the corollary of making a challenge; 1) the challenge confers honour, 2) a challenge can bring the challenger dishonour, 3) the challenge must be among equals or brings dishonour to the one making and/or the one accepting the challenge. Bourdieu also relates game theory to game honour in that, “each player chooses to play the game as well as he can while assuming that his adversary is capable of making the same choice” (p. 12). Where the rules of honour reflect the corollaries of exchange and opportunity for riposte, the sense of honour is the cultivated disposition which comes from practice. Mastery of practice through the manipulation of time transforms the mechanics and rules to strategy.
